



The Allied-Heublein Joint Venture
One ofthe most widely publicized cooperativejoint ventures involved the world's
largest grapecooperative, Allied Grape GrowersofFresno, California. Allied entered
into anagreementwith Heublein, Inc. in 1968 whereby Heubleinacquireda majority
interest in Allied's wholly owned wine subsidiary, United Vintners. The parties also
enteredinto a lengthy Supply Contractspecifying the conditions under which Allied
growers would supply grapes to United Vintners.
Although both parties had expected to benefitsubstantially from thearrangement,
these expectations were dashed quickly and totally. The ink had barely dried on the
arrangement when the signing parties became embroiled in a bitter conflict over
intent, purpose, and execution ofthejoint venture. The result was lengthy litigation
culminatingin a courtorderdeclaring theSupply Contract null and void and requir-
ing Allied to sell its stock interestintheventure to Heublein. Theseevents very nearly
wrecked the cooperative.
The purpose ofthis paper is to identify the various sources ofconflict leading to
the venture's failure, thereby perhaps helping those contemplating similar ventures
from repeating these mistakes. The examination will: (1) describe the financial and
organizational characteristics ofthe parties, (2) identify their apparent objectives, (3)
describe the legal nature ofthe venture, (4) detail thejointventure's operations, and
(5) identify the sources ofconflict between the parties.
The analysis is based on the public records ofthe Heublein-Allied litigation and a
Federal Trade Commission challenge ofthe venture, interviews with parties familiar
with the arrangement, and various public sources. I also received useful insights into
the issues involved from the economic experts for the parties in the Allied-Heublein
litigation discussed herein: Dr. Leon Garoyan (Allied) and Dr. Ronald D. Knutson
(Heublein).
The Joint Venture Partners
Allied Grape Growers
Allied Grape Growers (Allied) is a nonprofit cooperative organized through a
predecessor cooperative in 1951. In 1959 Allied acquired United Vintners from the
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Petri family for$25 million andin 1964 acquired for $1 million the Inglenookwinery,
one ofCalifornia's finest (Plaintiffs Brief 1978, p. 1). Allied placed these wineries in
a wholly owned subsidiary, United Vintners (United).
United crushed the grapes delivered by Allied's 1,600 members-and some non-
members-and produced all types ofwines, including table, dessert, and sparkling.
Most of the wines were sold under the Italian Swiss Colony, Petri, Inglenook, and
Lejon brands. In 1968 United's sales were $96 million, which made it the nation's
second largest winery, making 17.9 percent of all wines sold in the United States.
Gallo, the nation's largest winery, made 24 percent of all wine sales in the United
States. The third largest winery, Taylor, made only 3.1 percent of all wines (FTC
Initial Decision, pp. 492).
Heublein, Inc.
Heublein, Inc. is oneofAmerica's oldestcompanies, founded in 1862 in Hartford,
Connecticut, as the House ofHeublein. In 1892 it invented the bottled cocktail and
in 1939 acquired the rights to the most prominentvodka brand, Smimoffs. By 1969
Heublein had sales of$520 million and was a leading manufacturer and distributor
ofalcoholic beverages and specialty food products. Although only the fifth largest
domestic seller ofalcoholic beverages, it held dominant positions in some segments.
It was theleadingsellerofpremiumbrandvodka(Smimoff, Popov, ReIska, Koskorva,
and Arrow brands), the leading seller oftequila (Jose Cuervo and Matador brands),
and dominated the market for Cordiales (Irish Mist and three other brands) and
domestic prepared cocktails (Impact, p. 32). Heublein made less than 1 percent of
wine sales in the United States and about 5 percentofall wine imports. Anaggressive
merchandiser, in 1970 Heublein was one ofthe nation's major advertisers and the
second largest liquor advertiser (FTC Complaint).
The Joint Venture
The Allied-Heubleinjoint venture involved two separate agreements. One agree-
mentcoveredtheacquisitionofUnited Vintnersby a newly formed holdingcompany,
Heublein Allied Vintners, Inc. (Vintners). The agreement was executed September
26, 1968, and the merger was consummated February 21, 1969.
The ownership structure of the joint venture is displayed in figure 1. Heublein
received an 82 percent interest in Vintners in return for Heublein stock valued at
about $33 million. The $33 million in securities and the remaining 18 percent of
Vintners stock were allocated amongAllied membersaccording to their proportional
interest in the capital fund ofthe premerger Allied. By 1968, Allied members had
accumulated capital credits from patron returns of$25.3 million. Themembers then
contributed the 18 percent stock interest to Allied in exchange for $7.6 million in
capital fund credits (Allied Decision, pp. 2-4). Although the Vintners stock did not
pay dividends, Allied was to receive 20 percentofthe pretax income ofVintners. As
a result ofthese various transactions, Heublein had an 82 percent interest and Allied
an 18 percent interest in Vintners, which was the sole owner of United Vintners
(United).
In addition to the merger agreement, the parties entered into an 80-year Supply
Contracteffective September 1, 1968. This was a lengthy andcomplex document. At
Allied's sole option, the contract could be terminated or renewed and extended after
20 years and at six successive 10-year terms. Thus, Heublein had agreed to an 80-Allied-Heublein Joint Venture/Mueller
Figure l.---Qwnership Structure ofUnited Vintners
United Vintners (United)
(Italian Swiss Colony. Petri, Inglenook & Lejon Brands)
Hueblein Allied Vintners, Inc. (Vintners)
(Holding Company with 100% of United Vintners Stock)
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year commitment that Allied, alone, could terminate before then. The contract
requiredAllied todeliverandUnitedtoacceptatleast410,525 tonsofgrapesannually,
which was about 25 percent of California's grape production in 1969. Both parties
expected this amount to grow over time (Goldberg 1970, p. 2).
Although the Supply Contract covered a variety ofother subjects, two ofthe most
crucial and complicated were the price and profit-sharing provisions. United agreed
to pay Allied members the "market price" for grapes, which was defined as the
weighted average price for each variety of grapes as reported by the Federal-State
Market News Service. Because such prices were not available for all varieties, the
agreement had an additional six paragraphs defining the market price in the event
the Market News Service did not reportsuch a price. Inaddition to the market price
paid growers, United agreed to pay Allied each year 20 percent of the operating
income of United.
Among other provisions of the Supply Contract were those spelling out: (a) the
prices to be paid for grapes supplied by growers otherthan Allied; (b) the treatment
to beaccordedAllied members' grapessupplied inexcess oftheagreed-upontonnage
annually; (c) the terms at which United would make loans to Allied for usein making
advances to growers; (d) purchase ofcapital stock upon expiration, termination, or
failure to performunderthecontract; (e) the provisionofadditionalcapital to United
by Allied and Heublein; and (f) thearbitration proceduresto be followed in theevent
of disputes relating to the agreement or in the event conditions arose relating to
unforeseen circumstances not covered by the Agreement. The arbitration provision
called for an arbitration board ofthree members: one to be appointed by each party
and a third to be a full marketing professor from either the University ofCalifornia
at Berkeley or Stanford University.48 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1990
Each of these and other terms sought to spell out the treatment of matters of
mutual interest that would ultimately determine how the benefits and costs of the
joint venture would be divided between the parties.
Objectives of the Joint Venture
As with all joint ventures, when consummated both parties expected to benefit
from the arrangement. Theobjectives ofthe parties were spelled out in 1970 by one
of the economic consultants advising in establishing thejoint venture. As he saw it,
there were two main motives for Allied's participation (Goldberg 1970, pp. 3-4). Most
important, in his view, was the capital problem facing growers. By August 31, 1968,
Allied members had accumulated $25,319,318 in credits to Allied's capital fund.
These credits averaged nearly $16,000 per member and in excess of $200,000 for
the largest members (Bedwell). Moreover, credits were expected to continue to grow
as the capital needs ofthe winery grew. Since these credits had very litde liquidity,
growers were interested in a scheme that would permit them to continue to get the
benefits from owning a large winery without tying up a lot oftheir capital.
Thesecond problemfacingAllied was thatcompetingwineries were growinglarger
and more powerful domestically and internationally. Allied members expected the
merger with Heublein to give them a "piece of the action" in the domestic and
international markets.
The president of Heublein believed the joint venture could be the next major
acquisition since it acquired Hamms Brewing Co. in 1965.1 He believed that by
acquiringaninterestin United, Heubleinwouldbeina"positiontoutilizeits marketing
skills ina growth marketfor flavorful moderate-proofalcoholic beverages" (Goldberg
1970, p. 1). Heublein believed the joint venture would enable Heublein to exploit
quickly its proven marketing know-how in liquors in a new growth market, which
otherliquorcompanies hadalready entered. Also, theSupplyContractgave Heublein
anassured sourceofgrapes for atleast 20 years and, at Allied's option, upto 80years.
Although not mentioned by the above authority, Heublein obviously viewed the
venture as an efficient way ofacquiring a majority interest in the brands and other
assets ofthe nation's second largest winery.
Reasons the Venture Failed: The Allied View
Although the parties to the Allied-Heublein joint venture originally believed it
promised benefits toall concerned, the promisedbenefits failed to materialize, atleast
inAllied's view. Theleadingcontemporaryanalystofthejointventurewas enthusiastic
about the expected benefits while failing to identify expIlcidy as "disadvantages" the
key problem that ultimately led to its failure.2 Although it is not clear when Allied
first becamedisenchanted with the venture, its officials subsequendy alleged the roots
of the problem were in false statements and failure to disclose certain material
facts while the venture was being negotiated during 1968-69. Allied felt sufficiendy
aggrieved to initiate alawsuit on March 19, 1975, chargingthat: (a) Huebleincommit-
ted fraud when inducing Allied to sell its interest in United Vintners and therefore
should be required to return its interest in United to Allied; and (b) Heublein
mismanaged United thereby breaching its duties to Allied as a minority stockholder
and therefore should compensate Allied for the injury sustained by its members
(Plaintiff's Brief 1977). We now tum to an examination ofthese allegations.Allied-Heublein Joint Venture/Mueller 49
Alleged Misrepresentations by Heublein
Allied claimed that the main reasons the venture failed to live up to its promise
werelinkedto Heublein'sexaggeratedclaimsconcerningits expertiseintheCalifornia
wine business. Allied claimed it was led to believe that Heublein would be able to
operate United Vintners much more successfully than had Allied. Heublein's growth
history demonstrated that it had considerable expertise and had achieved strong
market positions in vodka, prepared cocktails, and Cordiales. Prior to acquiring
United, Heublein producedless than 1percentofthewine madein the UnitedStates.
It is not clear, however, that there were significant synergies in marketing wine and
Heublein's traditional lines ofalcoholic beverages. In any event, Allied claimed that
afterit sold United to Heublein, United was less successful than when it hadoperated
as Allied's subsidiary. Thecourt records on this matterare sealed. However, whereas
in 1968,whenAllied was sole ownerofUnited Vintners,itproducedabout22 percent
ofwine sales in the United States, by 1976 Heublein made about 17 percentofsuch
sales (Impact, p. 39). Moreover, whereas between 1968 and 1972 United Vintner's
share ofwine sales fell from 17.9 percent to 14.5 percent, Gallo's share rose from
24.0 percent to 32.4 percent (FTC Initial Decision, p. 492).
Allied claimed that Heublein withheld other material information that, ifknown
by Allied in 1969, would have caused it to not enter the venture. Itclaimed Heublein
hadnottold Allied during 1968-69thattheFederalTradeCommissionwas investigat-
ing Heublein's 82 percentacquisition ofUnited Vintners (Plaintiff's Brief1978, p. 4).
Thisbecame relevantbecause the FederalTradeCommissionbeganinvestigatingthe
merger sometime in early 1969 and subsequently challenged it as a violation ofthe
antitrust laws (see below).
Allied also claimed that Heublein had represented that the 80-year full Supply
Contract with Allied was legal. This became an important issue because Heublein,
itself, subsequently challenged the legality of the contract, asserting it violated the
antitrust laws (see below).
United Violated the Supply Contract
The venture's Supply Contract stated that United shall be required to take from
Allied at least 410,525 tons ofgrapes annually. Allied alleged that as partand parcel
ofHeublein's false representations regarding its expertise in the wine business, Heu-
blein not only promised to never purchase less than 410,525 tons annually from
Allied members, but that Heublein promised that within five years United would
purchase about 550,000 tons annually (Plaintiff's Brief 1978, p. 3). Because of its
shortfall in wine sales beginning in the early 1970s, in most years thereafter United
purchased from Allied less than the required 410,525 tons.
Financial Conflicts of Interests in Dividing United's Net Income
The Supply Contract provided that Allied would annually receive 20 percent of
the pretax income of United. This income represented revenues for wines less
United's cost ofproducing and distributing the wines. Allied claimed that Heublein
andUnited engagedinthe following practicesthatunfairlyaffectedUnited'sreported
net income.
(1) Although transfer prices always represent a potential source ofconflict injoint
ventures, to my knowledge Allied didnotclaim thatgrowershadbeentreatedunfairly50 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1990
by the formula devised to define the "market price" ofthe grapes growers supplied
United. Allied did claim, however, that growers were treated unfairly under the 20
percent profit-sharing element of the transfer price because Heublein had inflated
United's costs and reduced its revenues (see 2-5 below).
(2) Heublein allegedly had inflated United's financing costs by charging United an
interest rate of 1 percent above prime, an amount allegedly exceeding the rate paid
by Heublein. Heublein lent money to United annually, with a loan balance varying
from $80 million to $100 million. Allied also sought damages because the interest
rate at times exceeded the usury law ofCalifornia, which limited interest rates to 10
percent (Plaintiff's Brief 1977, p. 3).
(3) Allied claimed that its members had, in effect, lent large amounts to United
interest free because of the way United paid Allied's members for the grapes they
delivered: United paid growers one-halfofthe purchase priceofa crop thefollowing
December 31 and the otherhalfJune30. This allegedly amounted to aninterest-free
loan to United by Allied members. However, this treatment appeared to be similar
to that received by grape growers selling to independent wineries.
(4) Allied also claimed that Heublein deliberately reduced United's revenues and
growth by acquiring for Heublein's own interests three wineries that Allied believed
should have been acquired by United, which would have increased the demand for
thegrapesofAllied members(Plaintiff's Brief1977, p. 3). Instead, Heubleinallegedly
kept for itselfthe benefits ofthese wineries, at least oneofwhich, Beaulieu Wineries,
grew very rapidly after being acquired. Moreover, this situation created potential
conflicts of interest in accurately allocating wine marketing and distribution costs
between Heublein's wholly owned wineries and United.
(5) Allied claimed that at times United imposed more stringent quality standards
on Allied members than were applied by the industry generally. In some instances,
after United had rejected a member's grapes the member sold the grapes to other
wineries. Indeed, sometimes the rejected grapes were accepted by another winery
owned by Heublein, which Allied claimed supported it assertion of arbitrary and
unfair treatment of its members. Allied claimed that this treatment had made it
increasingly difficult to acquire grapes (Plaintiff's Brief 1977, p. 34). Independent
arbitrators subsequently found that United had notused industrystandardsand were
therefore improper under the Supply Contract.
United Did Not Improve Allied Member Returns
United clearly failed to perform as anticipated by both parties when they entered
the venture. This was most manifest in United's declining pretax income, ofwhich
Allied growers were to receive 20 percent annually as premiums. Whereas initially
grower share of profits averaged more than $2 per ton, by the mid-1970s growers
received practically nothing. These lower than expected returns and the practices
Allied complainedofallegedly injuredAllied as well as its membergrowers. Itclaimed
that United's poor performance caused many growers to stop selling through Allied
and that as a result Allied was not always able to supply United's needs, thereby
making Allied a less viable competitor. For whatever reason, United evidently had
been more successful when owned by Allied than after being acquired by Heublein
in 1969. Allied supported its claim that United's poor performance was due to
Heublein's failings with the fact that during the years that United operated unprofit-
ably, its largest competitor operated profitably.Allied-Heublein Joint Venture/Mueller 51
Reasons the Venture Failed: The Heublein View
Heublein, like Allied, had formed thejoint venture expecting to enjoy substantial
benefits therefrom. Once the venture foundered, Heublein alleged that Allied had
failed to perform as anticipated, thereby undermining the viability ofthe venture. It
also disputed all the charges Allied made against Heublein, as follows.
Heublein Did Not Misrepresent Any Material Facts
Heublein denied Allied's claims that Heublein made various misrepresentations
while negotiatingthetermsoftheventure. Heubleinsaid therehadbeennomisrepre-
sentation of its expertise in the wine business, since Allied management knew that
Heublein had less than 1.0 percent ofthe wine business and that its experience was
limited to handling foreign imports. This had been stated in a prospectus filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Moreover, Hueblein denied that any of
the statements or charts used in describing its business to Allied management were
false. Heublein performed poorly after 1969 because of changed circumstances in
the wine industry beyond its control. It further claimed that United's pre-1969
earnings had been overstated and that Allied members benefited from the venture
because United actually subsidized Allied members when unforeseen economic cir-
cumstances made United unprofitable. Heublein also claimed it had increased the
valueofUnited, and thatthis was the reasonAllied wantedto buyitback (Defendant's
Memorandum, p. 8).
Heublein denied that it had purposely misled Allied regarding the Federal Trade
Commission investigation. Heublein said it did not know ofthe investigation before
the mergerwas consummated February 21, 1969, and did not learnofthe investiga-
tion untilit received theFTC's letter February 27, 1969. Moreover, immediately upon
learningofthe FTC's interest, Heublein promised Allied to take careofthe antitrust
problem and fulfilled that promise despite Allied's open assistance to the FTC in the
effort to get back United (Defendant's Memorandum, p. 9).
Heublein also challenged Allied's claim that it had been misled regarding the
probable legal status of the 80-year Supply Contract. Heublein claimed that Allied
was fully aware ofa potential antitrust problem. A district courtsubsequendy agreed,
concluding thatAllied's lawyer had recognized in 1968 the possibility thatthe contract
might be illegal and that therefore Allied had assumed the risk of this possibility
(Allied Decision, p. 18).
United's Violation ofthe Supply Contract
Heubleincontendedthatalthoughithadagreedto purchase410,525 tonsofgrapes
per year, it had agreed to include this provision in the Supply Contract only because
it had been misled by Allied. Only after the merger did Heublein learn that this
provision was commercially impractical. Heublein claimed it had no willful intent to
breach the contact when signing it but had been forced to do so by unforeseen
circumstances. Moreover, at times Allied tailed to supply as many grapes as United
required (Allied Decision, pp. 7-8).
Heublein Had Kept Allied Infonned of United's Operations
Heublein denied thatit had misled Allied regarding United's currentand prospec-
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also were members ofUnited's board ofdirectors. As such, these directors allegedly
had ample opportunity to obtain from United management whatever information
was required to make informed decisions (Defendant's Memorandum, pp. 6-7).
Financial Conflicts ofInterest in Dividing Net Income
Heublein rejected all Allied's claims onthis point, asserting that the interest rate of
prime plus I percentthat itcharged United was a market rateanddid notviolate the
California usury law. Additionally, it argued that the law was unconstitutional.
Heublein acknowledged that it purchased for its own operations three wineries
after the creation ofthe venture. ButHeublein said that in 1969 and 1971 the parties
had executed amendments to the Supply Contract authorizing Heublein to make
these purchases. Moreover, it said Hueblein had purchased the Bartolucci Brothers
winery in November 1976 for United's benefit at considerable expense (Defendant's
Brief, p. 4).
Reasons for Heublein's Poor Pedormance
In Heublein's view, United performed poorly after 1969, primarily because of
changed circumstances beyond Heublein's control. Grape prices rose sharply and
there was a declining demand for the sweeter wines on which United had concen-
trated. Without its backing, Heublein claimed, United would have fared even worse.
By 1976 United had "turned" the comer and in unprofitable years it actually had
subsidized Allied growers. Even the plaintiff's economic expert acknowledged that
United was making progress by 1978 (Defendant's Memorandum, p. 8).
Heublein further claimed that a major reason for United's poor performance was
that Allied and other grape associations had attempted and succeeded in raising the
price of wine grapes to wineries, including United. Heublein claimed that Allied,
Sun Maid Raisin Growers Association, and the Raisin Bargaining Association had
conspired to raise grape prices, thereby inflating transfer prices between United and
Allied's growers. Although these grape associations were competitors, they had a
number ofinterlocking directors, e.g., the chairman ofAllied was a director on Sun
Maid's board. AccordingtoHeublein, Allied andSunMaid hadcooperatedincreating
the Wine Bargaining Association in order to raise both raisin and wine grape prices.
Sun Maid and the Raisin Growers Bargaining Association allegedly controlled 80 to
85 percent of the raisin market, sufficient to confer monopoly power. This power
allegedly increased grape prices to wineries, thereby increasing United's costs (Defen-
dant's Brief, p. 4-6)
The Supply Contract Was Unlawful
In addition to the above responses to Allied claims, Heublein charged that the 80-
year Supply Contract violated the antitrust laws because it foreclosed a substantial
partoftheCalifornia market. Thisargumentultimately carried the day for Heublein,
culminatingin a district courtopinionJuly 21, 1978, finding thatthecontractviolated
Section 3 ofthe Clayton Act and Section 1 ofthe Sherman Act (Allied Decision).
The District Court Opinion
After Allied had filed its suit against Heublein on March 19, 1975, the latter filed
a counterclaim charging, inter alia, that the exclusive SupplyContractbetween AlliedAllied-HeubleinJoint Venture/Mueller 53
and Heublein was unlawful. A jury trial, lasting from April 3, 1978, until June 1,
1978, ended in a hungjury. Thedistrictcourtthen rendered a declaratoryjudgment
finding the Supply Contract unlawful (Allied Decision).
The court found that the 80-year contract was a full Supply Contract foreclosing
the following percentagesoffive submarketsin which United purchased grapes from



















Thecourt concluded that these shares, when viewed together with otherevidence,
constituted a substantial foreclosure ofvarious markets. It further found that oneof
Allied's specific purposes in proposing the contract had been to foreclose markets to
competitors. Through such foreclosure it had hoped to stabilize and enhance the
level ofgrape prices. Because the Supply Contract set prices based onthose reported
by the Federal Market News Service, the contract prohibited United from buying
from Allied at prices below the current market price which, in the court's view, gave
Allied potential control over price. The court believed that Allied had used the
contract to force United to buy 200,000 tons ofgrapes it did notneed and had failed
to deliver 500,000 tons that United did need (Allied Decision, pp. 7-9).
The court further found that by lessening competition the contract stifled innova-
tion and product improvement because growers delivering to United were not
rewarded for producing superior quality grapes. This result followed, in the court's
view, because United "pooled" growers' grapes, thereby preventing United from
compensating individual growers on the basis ofquality (Allied Decision, p. 9).
The court apparently believed that the vertical integration the parties had sought
to achieve in their joint venture was itself suspect. By integrating certain of their
marketing anddistribution decisions, the parties hadagreed to make decisionsjointly
rather than individually. In the court's view, given the extent ofmarket foreclosure
involved, this integration interfered adversely with free market forces. Although it
did notexamineany potentialefficiencyorprocompetitiveaspectsofthejointventure,
the court may have implicitly done so when it concluded that after 1969, "Allied's
motivation and practice was not to look after the best interests ofUnited orto supply
the grapes that United required but, rather, to obtain the maximum price possible
for its members' grapes" (Allied Decision, pp. 10-11). Notonly did Allied seekto raise
the prices ofits members' grapes, but it sought to stabilize prices for the entire grape
industry.
Inaddition to finding the Supply Contractan unlawful restraintoftrade, thecourt
found that Allied had not entered the merger agreement in the mistaken beliefthat
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Contract might be unlawful and that if it were found unlawful United would be
discharged from performing its obligations under the contract. After receiving this
and other advice, Allied management had decided, nonetheless, to sell United to
Heublein and enter the 80-year full Supply Contract (Allied Decision, p. 12).
Based on the above, the courtconcluded that the Supply Contractviolated Section
3oftheClaytonAct because: "[T]heevidence establishes thatthefull SupplyContract
is a full requirementscontract that may tend to substantially lessen competition in the
relevantmarketsandsubmarketsforthe purchaseandsaleofgrapes" (Allied Decision,
p. 18).
The court also found that the Supply Contract violated Section 1ofthe Sherman
Act because "Allied's purpose for negotiating and entering the Supply Contract was
to stabilize grape prices, and that the contract may be used to further this purpose"
(Allied Decision, p. 18). The court directed Allied to take no action to enforce the
contract and directed Heublein to purchase the Vintner's common stock owned by
Allied as provided in the Supply Contract in the event ofits termination. Heublein
was awarded trial costs andreasonable legal fees andexpenses incurredin connection
with its counterclaim contesting the lawfulness ofthe Supply Contract.
It is not clear whether the district court decision would be sustained today, given
the legal developments ofthe 1980s. Thecourt had relied primarily onthe Supreme
Court decision in Standard Oil Co. ofCalifornia v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949),
which involved smaller market shares than those foreclosed by the Supply Contract.
OnJanuary 23, 1985, theJustice Department issued Veri:U:al Restraint5 Guidelines that
adopt a very tolerant view ofvertical restraints. But although the antitrust agencies
are less likely today than in the past to challenge such restraints, private parties are
not constrained from doing so.
FTC Challenge of Heublein's Acquisition of United Vintners
TheAllied-Heubleinventurewas doggedby anotherantitrustproblem. OnDecem-
ber 7, 1972, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a complaint alleging Heu-
blein's 82 percent interest in United Vintners violated Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act
andSection 5ofthe FederalTradeCommission Act. Thecomplaintcharged thatthe
merger eliminated substantial actual and potential competition in the wine industry.
Therequested reliefwould have requireddivestitureofHeublein's 82 percentinterest
in United Vintners with first purchase rights to be given to Allied Grape Growers
(FTC Complaint).
The matter was litigated over the next eight years. OnJuly 11, 1975, Heublein
reached an agreementwith the FTC staffwhereby Heublein agreed to divest United
Vintners except for certain ofits wine operations. In 1976 the Commission not only
rejected the staffs proposed settlement, but amended the original complaint by
adding as defendants Allied Grape Growers, Inc., United Vintners, and Heublein
Allied Vintners, Inc. (Hueblein, Inc., pp. 2913-14).
Following a trial beginning in December 1977, an FTC Administrative lawJudge
concluded that the acquisition was unlawful and ordered Heublein to divest United
Vintnerswithin oneyear and not make further mergers involving wineries with more
than 10 percent of the market within the following 10 years (FTC Initial Decision,
pp. 571-72). Heublein appealed the decision to the Commission. In October 1980,
the Commission overturned the Administrative lawJudge'S decision, finding that
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thatcomplaintcounsel had failed to prove thatHeubleinhadsuch special competitive
potential that "its small market share understated its possible future competitive
significance" (FTC Decision, p. 581).
Post-1980 Developments
Allied did not appeal the district court's 1978 declaratoryjudgment. As ordered
by the court, Allied sold back to Heublein the 18 percent interest in United. Allied
then entered into a nonexclusive Supply Contract with Heublein. During 1979-82,
Allied operated solely as agrapemarketingcooperativeselling to Heubleinandothers
(Bedwell).
The original FTC complaint would have required Heublein to divest United
Vintners with first purchase rights to be given Allied. This option disappeared when
in 1976 the FTC included Allied in an amended complaint challenging Heublein's
82 percent interest in United Vintners. With the FTC's dismissal ofthe case against
Heublein in 1980, Heublein was permitted to retain United Vintners. Apparently
Heublein's wine operations proved less rewarding than it had hoped, since in 1983
itvoluntarilysold fourwineries, includingItalianSwiss Colony, toAllied, which placed
the wineries in a wholly owned subsidiary, ISC Wineries, Inc. When the operations
failed to tum a profit, inJune 1987 Allied sold ISC to Early Industries ofCalifornia
(Bedwell). On October 12, 1982, Heublein, Inc. also disappeared as an independent
entity when it was acquired by R. J. Reynolds, the$13 billion tobacco-food processing
conglomerate (R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., p. 3310).
SinceJune 1987, Allied has operated solely as a grape marketing cooperative. Its
membership had fallen from a peak ofabout 1,600 members in 1969 to about 500
members in 1989. Allied management attributes much of the decline in Allied's
fortunes to the failed joint venture. Ofcourse, history will not be replayed to tell us
what Allied's fate would have been had it not entered thejoint venture in 1969.
Conclusions
The Allied-Heublein venture should be viewed within the framework ofall joint
ventures, both those involving cooperative and investor-owned businesses. Such ven-
tures cover a broad spectrum of legal arrangements lying between simple contract
integrationandownershiparrangementssimilarto theAllied-Heubleinarrangement.
Jointventures differimportantly from contracted arrangementsormerger. Contrac-
tualarrangementscoordinatesomeactivities amongseparatebusinesses while permit-
ting each to maintain its corporate identity. Mergers consolidate completely separate
firms into a single one. Businesses undertaking joint ventures implicitly reject the
alternative forms in the belief that the benefits sought can be achieved through
creatingalimited-purposebusinessentityownedjointlyby the partnersto theventure,
while maintaining their separate corporate independence.
Jointventures often involve morecomplex arrangements thancontractintegration
or complete merging oftwo parties. Complexity stems from the requirement that a
joint venture must be operated to satisfY often conflicting goals ofthe parties. The
difficulty ofresolving satisfactorily such conflicts perforce makejointventures poten-
tially unstable business arrangements. Such instability is not unique to ventures
between cooperative and investor-owned enterprises. One study found that some
seven outoftenjointventures amonginvestor-owned firms fell shortofexpectations
or were disbanded (McKinsey & Co.).56 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1990
There were several sources of conflicts between Allied and Heublein. Some of
these occurred because both parties apparently entered the venture without fully
understanding one another's business sufficiently to form realistic expectations con-
cerning potential benefits. Tosucceed,jointventures require a greatdeal ofgive and
take between the parties precisely because it is impossible to anticipate all potential
conflicts. Because the Allied-Heublein venture failed almost immediately to perform
as well as originally anticipated, the parties did notenjoy a grace period duringwhich
to establish a mutually satisfactory relationship. Had United's sales and profits soared
in the 1970s to themutualbenefitofthe parties, theymayhavedevelopedtheworking
rules necessary for resolving many ofthe conflicts that subsequently were contested
incourt. Ofcourse, insofaras therewas meritto Allied'sclaimsoffraudulentmisrepre-
sentation during 1968-69, theventureseemeddoomed from thestart.3Onewonders,
however, why Heubleinwouldenteran arrangementdestinedtofail. Afterall,during
1969-78 it entered into four otherjoint ventures (three foreign and one domestic)
with investor-owned businesses that continued to operate through 1981, the year
before it was acquired by R. J. Reynolds (Heublein, Inc.).
Quite apart from the above, there seemed to have been several serious conflicts in
the goals of the parties. Most of these had a direct or indirect bearing on the net
revenue ofthe venture.
Apparently both parties were satisfied with the formula they had devised to deter-
mine the marketpriceat which grapeswere transferred to United. Allied was dissatis-
fied with its net returns from United, not with the mechanism for determining the
transfer price ofthe raw product. However, conflicts arose overthe following alleged
ancillary practices that also affected the income ofAllied growers.
1. Hueblein did not have the degree ofexpertise required to market wine on the
scale ofthe venture.
2. Heublein charged excessive interest rates on funds lent to United, thereby
inflating its costs.
3. Allied growers were denied the opportunity to share in the expandingdemand
for their grapes when Heublein, rather than United, acquired additional win-
eries.
4. United refused to acquire all grapes offered by Allied growers by imposing
bogus quality standards.
5. Heublein failed to purchase and at times Allied refused to deliver as many
grapes as specified in the Supply Contract.
Apparently, thefirst problem identified above was a serious one, perhaps permeat-
ing many aspects ofthe relationship. The wine market was changing and Hueblein
allegedly did not realize oradapt to this, whereas its leading competitor did.4 A shift
was occurring from consumption ofsweet wines to dry, table wines. Not recognizing
this, Hueblein allegedly contracted to buy sweet grape varieties not suited for wines
demanded by consumers. When a party to ajoint venture has little experience with
a product, there will be considerable and unexpected learning costs. Too often,
managers, directors, and farmer-members of a cooperative are overawed by the
apparent superior marketing know-how of large, investor-owned businesses, who
may survive errors in management and marketing one product only because they
have some product lines with large profit margins. It is imperative, therefore, that a
cooperative make sure the other party actually has the expertise it promises to bring
to the venture.
The second and third allegations mentioned above did not pose problems unique
tojointventures involving agricultural cooperatives. Indeed, they were anticipated toAllied-HeubleinJoint Venture/Mueller 57
varying degrees in the Supply Contract, and it should have been possible to resolve
them through the arbitration procedures established in the contract.
The fourth and fifth allegations cited above, which involved differences over the
appropriate volumeofgrapes to process annually, may have posed problems unique
to ventures between agricultural cooperatives and investor-owned businesses. The
conflicts may have arisen because members of an agricultural cooperative typically
want to marketall theirproductsatthe market price. Historically, growers oftenhave
joined cooperatives to find a home for their entire crop (Mueller and Tinley, pp. 8-
12). In contrast, profit maximizing by a food processor selling in an oligopolistic
market requires adjusting the volume ofpurchases from growers to meet consumer
demand as reflected in the firm's share ofthe market. Heublein said that it had not
realized when signingthesupplyagreementin 1969thatit was impractical to guaran-
tee Allied an assured demand for about 400,000 tons ofgrapes annually.
Heublein's main complaint regarding Allied's conduct was that it was more inter-
ested in the general level ofgrape prices than in the profitability ofUnited Vintners.
Simply put, because ofits sponsorship ofgrape bargaining associations, Allied alleg-
edly behaved more like a bargaining cooperative than as a business partner in a
vertically integratedjointventure. Iftrue, this represents another potentially impor-
tant conflict in joint ventures between investor-owned businesses and agricultural
cooperatives.
The Allied-Heublein joint venture ultimately proved fatally flawed because the
Supply Contractviolated the antitrustlaws. But, most probably this antitrust problem
would not have been raised had the parties not disagreed on other matters. Very
probably in today's antitrust environment the antitrust agencies, which are especially
hospitable to vertical agreements, would not challenge the Supply Contract. And
although the FTC complaint challenging Heublein's acquisition of United Vintners
was initiated independentlyofthe parties, themergerwas ultimatelyapprovedby the
FTC.
The antitrust problems involved here nonetheless demonstrate the antitrust expo-
sure ofagricultural cooperatives when they engage injointventures. When entering
ventureswith investor- owned firms, agricultural cooperatives lose thelimited protec-
tion from antitrustprosecutionaccordedbytheCapper-VolsteadAct(Mueller). While
the Heublein-United Vintners merger ultimately passed antitrust muster because of
the small market shares involved, the antitrust agencies have in recent years blocked
atleast one venture between an agricultural cooperative andan investor-owned firm.
And even when an antitrust agency does not challenge ajointventure, it still may be
challenged by private parties, which historically have initiated most antitrust cases
involving agricultural cooperatives. Because ofthese several factors, parties to ajoint
venture should never overlook their potential vulnerability under the antitrust laws.
Notes
1. The Hamm's acquisition proved a dismal failure. After paying $62 million in preferred
stock for Hamm's in 1965, Heublein sold Hamm's in 1973 for $6 million (Heublein, Inc.).
2. The only disadvantages he identified were the probability that: (1) Heublein would be
more directly affected by the growing labor turmoil in agriculture; (2) the cooperative would
not retain all the profits ofthe winery though the venture might bring larger total profits; and
(3) Heublein would be obliged to get involved in time-consuming agronomic problems ofthe
farmer-stockholders (Goldberg 1972, p. 118).
3. The court did not address this issue.58 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1990
4. Ofcourse, had Allied continued as sole ownerofUnited, it too may have failed to identify
and/or failed to adopt to the changing market.
References
Allied Decision, Allied Grape Growers, et al. v. Heuhlein, Inc., et ai., Civil No. C-75-0456
(LHB), Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Legality of Supply
Contract, July 21, 1978. Unpublished opinion.
Bedwell, Barry, President, Allied Grape Growers. Fresno, California.
Defendant's Brief, Allied Grape Growers, et al., v. Heuhlein, Inc., Civil No. C-75-0456
(LHB), March 23, 1977.
Defendant's Memorandum in Supportofa Defendant's Motion for a Directed Ver-
dict, Allied Grape Growers, et al., v. Heuhlein Grape Growers, et ai., Civil No. C-75-0456
(LHB), May 6, 1978.
FTC Complaint, In the Matter ofHeuhlein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385-93 (1980).
FTC Decision, In the Matter ofHeuhlein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 574-99 (1980).
FTC Initial Decision, In the Matter of Heublein, Inc. 96 F.T.C. 393-573 (1980).
Goldberg, Ray A., Heuhlein, Inc. (C), Harvard Business School Case Study, 1970.
Goldberg, Ray A., "Profitable Partnerships: Industry and Farmer Co-ops," Harvard
Business Review, March-April 1972, pp. 108-127.
Heublein, Inc., Moody's Industrial Manual, 1982, pp. 2913-14.
Impad, The American Distilled Spirit Market, Review and Forecast, 1977.
McKinsey & Co. in "Odd Couples," Business Week, July 21, 1986, p. 100.
Mueller, Willard F., and J.M. Tinley, Membership Marketing Contracts ofAgricultural
Cooperatives in California. California Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 760,
1958.
Mueller, Willard F., "The Capper Volstead Exemption," Report to the President and
Attorney of the National Cammission for the Review ofAntitrust Laws and Procedures,
Volume II, January 22, 1979, pp. 249-64.
Plaintiff's Brief, AUied Grape Growers, et ai., v. Heuhlein, Inc., et al., Civil No. C-75-0456
(LHB), February 14, 1977.
Plaintiff's Brief, AUied Grape Growers et al., v. Heuhlein, Inc., et al., Civil No. C-75-0456
(LHB), April 1, 1978.
R.J. Reynolds, Industries, Inc., Moody's Industrial Manual, 1983, pp. 3311-12.